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ABSTRACT 
 
The role of economic policy in Finland's depression of the 1990's is analyzed with a simple 
model of an open economy, and the conditions for a successful financial reform derived: 
Let the system adjust after the removal of interest rate ceilings, and the domestic interest 
rate then be aligned with foreign rates before liberalizing international capital flows. In 
Finland, the financial system was liberalized simultaneously with international capital 
movements, with the domestic shadow interest rate initially considerably higher than the 
international market rates. A capital inflow the size of the monetary base followed, leading 
to the “crazy years” of 1987-89. With a large current account deficit, the Bank of Finland 
tightened money sharply, causing a banking crisis practically wiping out the savings bank 
sector. The GDP declined by 13 %. Several lesser policy measures aggravated the crisis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During much of the 1990’s, Finland was in the deepest depression in its 
history. In the words of Currie (1993), “The Finnish economy has gone 
through an economic cycle, with boom and bust, of unusual ferocity…” “… in 
almost no other country has the amplitude of the cycle been so large.” Not 
only did its growth come to a halt, but the level of its GDP declined by 13 per 
cent and unemployment increased to 18–40 per cent depending on the 
definition. 21 % of the total number of firms failed and 23 % of households 
faced debt delinquencies. The country was plunged into a serious banking 
crisis. The savings bank sector, with a loan market share of 25 % in 1989, 
was all but wiped out, only a handful of banks with a share of 4 % surviving. 
The banking sector’s nonperforming loans were transferred to a junk loan 
institution, the cost of bank support being 10 % of the GDP. This “unusual 
ferocity” makes the Finnish depression “unusually interesting”, in offering 
potentially useful lessons to governments contemplating financial reforms. 
 
Of earlier writings, the account by Bordes (1993) serves as a representative 
sample; the liberalization of the financial system disrupted the economy. This 
led to an extraordinarily high inflation in asset prices, especially of shares and 
real estate. The boom was financed mainly by the banking sector. The 
demand for goods and services expanded rapidly. Fiscal policy was not 
sufficiently stringent, and the only possibility open to monetary authorities 
would have been to revalue the Finnmark, as the liberalized capital 
movements prevented monetary tightening without revaluation. 
 
On the whole, the deregulation was implemented in accordance with the 
general principles of finance, except that banking legislation was not 
sufficiently adapted to the new environment. Secondly, legislation prevented 
deregulation of tax-exempt accounts, whereas lending rates were freed. This 
led to an increase in the bank interest rate spread and acted as a spur to bank 
lending. In addition, there was a favorable terms of trade shock, but its 
contribution was negligible compared to the wealth effect resulting from the 
impact of liberalization. 
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The crisis erupted, as asset prices started their decline in early 1989 in 
response to the tightening of monetary conditions. The situation of the 
banking system deteriorated along with that of the private sector, mainly due 
to excessive exposure to interest rate risk and credit risk. The economy went 
into recession as households attempted to increase their saving. During the 
fall of 1990 the crisis hit the corporate sector, and was aggravated by the 
collapse of trade with the Soviet Union. The economy went into debt 
recession. (See also Drees et al. (1998), Honkapohja et al. (1999), Jonung et 
al. (1996), Kiander et al. (1996), Nyberg et al. (1994), Pazarbasioğlu (1997), 
Söderström (1993), and Vihriälä (1997).) 
 
It is of course easy to agree with the broad lines of this account. The purpose 
of this paper is to extend it by asking “why”: First, not all liberalizations of the 
financial system lead to a “disruption of the economy” of this magnitude. 
Indeed, economic theory does not provide a reason why the liberalization of 
interest rates should lead to uncontrolled credit expansion. The credit 
expansion potential of the banking system is regulated by the central bank's 
control over bank reserves, and the liberalization of interest rates has as such 
at most a marginal effect on these reserves if the interest rate at the discount 
window is also freed. The central bank can easily neutralize this effect. This 
notwithstanding, all the literature known to this author is based on the notion 
that liberalization leads to such an expansion. One of our objectives here is to 
provide an analysis of this process and determine the conditions for such an 
expansion and means of avoiding it. Secondly, monetary tightenings do not 
always lead to banking and economic crises. We will seek to identify the most 
important individual events, especially in view of the role economic policy 
played in them, so that the same mistakes could be avoided in future reforms. 
We may begin by examining a simple model of a small open economy and 
derive the conditions for a successful financial reform, and thereafter examine 
the Finnish events in the light of the model. 
 
It will be shown that, contrary to the common view, a boom (and bust) is not 
an inevitable consequence of financial market reform. The expansionary 
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effect of the removal of interest rate ceilings has to be offset by contractionary 
policies. It is important to let the economy adjust and then align the domestic 
interest rate with foreign rates (plus the expected currency depreciation) by 
means of a change in the policy mix. Only thereafter is it safe to liberalize 
international capital flows. It follows that both markets can be liberalized 
simultaneously if there is initially no excess demand on the domestic credit 
market at the ceiling rate and provided that rate stands roughly on a par with 
the foreign rate plus the expected depreciation in the exchange rate. 
 
With regard to the Finnish experience, two fatal policy moves stand out. 
Liberalization of domestic financial markets and international capital flows was 
implemented simultaneously, when the international interest rates were 
significantly below the domestic shadow rates. This is one of the deadly sins 
of economic reform and predictably caused a massive capital inflow, which 
doubled the monetary base in three years and led to uncontrolled credit 
expansion. The result was, in the words of the Central Bank Governor, the 
“crazy years”, when housing and stock prices doubled and general inflation 
accelerated. This appreciation of the real exchange rate led to a sizeable 
current account deficit, which necessitated contractionary economic policies 
to slow down the growth of imports. However, this was effected by means of a 
sharp monetary tightening, causing the market rate to increase by 6 
percentage points in three quarters, the rise in the final quarter of 1989 alone 
being 4 points. This second deadly sin predictably caused a banking crisis, 
which brought about the collapse of the savings bank sector, while the rest of 
the banking sector had to be rescued with massive infusions of state funds. 
When the country’s economy was in a "free fall", fiscal and monetary policies 
were tightened even after the basic situation had been reversed with 
successful devaluations. This could not but deepen and extend the 
depression. However, this, as well as other changes, was of minor 
significance compared to the two deadly sins. In short, we cannot agree with 
the above assessment that deregulation was implemented by and large 
correctly. 
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In the following, in Part 2, the behavior of an open economy is studied under 
general interest rate ceilings and after liberalization. The section ends with a 
brief discussion of the key problems associated with the transition from the 
former regime to the latter. Part 3 is a discussion of the events in the light of 
the model presented in Part 2. Part 4 consists in the conclusions drawn. 
 
2. THE THEORY 
 
In the first half of the eighties, Finland’s financial system was heavily 
regulated and bank-centered, and the money and securities markets were not 
well developed. Interest rates were kept low and stable by central bank 
regulation. This, together with the liberal deductibility of interest expenses and 
high marginal income tax rates, implied sharply negative real after-tax interest 
rates. There was a chronic excess demand for credit at the ceiling rate. The 
central bank controlled aggregate demand via its control over bank reserves, 
and banks then rationed out the excess demand for credit and thereby for 
goods. Interest rate regulation first took the form of loan and deposit rate 
ceilings. Later the ceilings applied to average loan rates capped by a usury 
ceiling. In addition there were quantitative lending restrictions. International 
capital flows were strictly controlled by means of licensing (see Drees et al. 
(1998)). Price competition not being possible, banks maximized profit by 
competing for the market share of deposits, which determined the bank’s 
potential loan stock. 
 
Our model is in the extended Mundell-Fleming (EMF) tradition. It would of 
course be fashionable to use a model consistent with the New Classical 
Economics (NCE) tradition, based on intertemporal utility maximization to 
derive, inter alia, the consumption function. However, the absence of market 
failures in many versions of these models leads to the conclusion that external 
imbalances are of little concern for policy as long as the government budget is 
balanced. Moreover, the underlying assumptions often imply near-Ricardian 
equivalence, which undoes many of the potential effects of fiscal policy.  
Since considerations of fiscal and monetary policy measures are central to the 
events to be analyzed, models with such features are unsuitable for our 
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purposes. Not only was rationing prevalent, but some of the key events are 
grounded on the presumption that national savings and employment may 
differ from their socially optimal levels. 
 
Of course, the NCE approach has recently been modified by imposing ad hoc 
market failures like credit constraints or Blanchard -type non-neutrality.  Then, 
when the models are made to account correctly for the critical rigidities and 
imperfections in the economy, their predictions need not substantially differ 
from those of the EMF model, as Dornbusch (1990) has pointed out. 
Moreover, Buiter (1990) has argued that if the effects of wealth accumulation 
are included in a consumption function which is not forward-looking, results 
qualitatively similar to the Blanchard model are obtained. While the EMF-type 
model is not appropriate for all purposes, we feel that with the wealth effect 
and a supply side it serves as a useful frame of reference for an analysis of 
events during the present episode. Another reason is that the Bank of Finland, 
like most central banks, as well as the Finnish Treasury, uses it in its 
forecasting as an empirically satisfactorily performing model. (See also 
Krugman (1991), (1993).) 
 
As to expectations, the initial conditions are those of a fixed exchange rate, a 
relatively rigid general interest rate ceiling, and tightly rationed international 
capital movements. After the liberalization, interest rate and exchange rate 
expectations consistent with least-squares learning had to be based on no or 
very few observations on the new regime up till 1989, when confidence in the 
sustainability of the exchange rate began to erode. The statements and 
behavior of business leaders and others nonetheless suggest that the agents 
believed the assurances of the Central Bank Governor that the exchange rate 
was being held stable, which is why the devaluation of 1991 caught them off 
guard. The focus of our interest being on a small number of discrete policy 
moves which caused a regime change, leading to the depression, static 
expectations can under the circumstances be regarded as a reasonable 
approximation under bounded rationality. 
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Secondly, postwar growth had been positive almost without exception, and 
housing prices had moved mainly upwards. It is thus reasonable to assume 
that agents expected recessions to be short and mild (reflected e.g. in the 
average debt-equity ratio of businesses of 4), housing prices to have an 
upward trend, and nominal interest rates to be stable (see Drees et al. 
(1998)). We will therefore use a static EMF model, supplemented by the 
wealth effect and the supply side, as a frame of reference (for an analysis in a 
dynamic EMF model with perfect foresight rational expectations, see e.g. 
Ahtiala (1998)). Of course, these expectations will also be assumed when the 
events in question are examined. 
 
A. The system under general interest rate ceilings 
 
The behavior of the system is illustrated in Figure 1, which is a standard IS-
LM diagram supplemented with the supply side. In the top sector total output 
 is on the horizontal and the interest rate ( )Y ( )r  on the vertical axis. The 
declining curve is the IS curve, which depicts the locus of equilibrium points 
on the goods market. The rising curve is the LM curve, depicting that on the 
money market. We have left the balance of payments (BP) curve out of the 
figure for the sake of clarity. For the same reason we have not drawn the 
movements of the curves in the figure. 
 
The lower sector represents the labor market, with employment  on the 
horizontal and the nominal wage 
( )N
( )W  on the vertical axis. The declining curve 
is the labor demand curve (the value of the marginal product of labor ( )), 
and the rising curve the labor supply curve. The model is formally derived and 
analyzed in the Appendix. 
N
DYP
 
In the absence of interest rate ceilings, the equilibrium point is at the 
intersection of the curves at income Y1 and interest rate r1. The quantity of 
labor demanded would be . We shall return shortly to the adjustment to this 
excess demand situation. 
1N
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Under general interest rate ceilings at 
_
r , total notional demand is at the 
intersection of the 
_
r  curve with the IS curve at Y2, while effective demand and 
output are at the intersection of the 
_
r  curve with the LM curve at Y0, the 
amount Y2 –Y0 being eliminated by credit rationing by banks -- this is thus 
that part of “credit rationing” which is due to the fact that the interest rate is 
rationed below its equilibrium level. Employment is  and the nominal wage 
rate . The shadow interest rate is . If the demand for (and supply of) 
money is a function of excess demand on the goods market (i.e. ; see 
the Appendix), there is a kink in the LM curve at its intersection with the IS 
curve, making the LM curve steeper from that point down. As suggested in 
Ahtiala (1977), the LM curve is normally rising mainly because rationed 
borrowers constitute only part of those demanding cash balances, so that La 
≥ Lr, a sufficient additional condition being EY + TY < 1, (see Eq. (14) in the 
Appendix). The demand for output is in this case at Y3, implying the quantity 
of labor demanded of  instead of the equilibrium amount  producing . 
An excess demand for domestic output leads to an increase in , which 
shifts the labor demand curve upwards (Eq. (7) in the Appendix). In the 
money wage model the supply of labor is a function of the nominal wage, so 
that the  curve remains as it stands. The new equilibrium is now roughly at 
 and  (note that the rise in 
0N
0W 0r
0<aL
3N 0N 0Y
DP
SW
3Y 3N
DP causes the IS and LM curves to shift left: 
the latter if the income elasticity of the demand for money is less than unity; 
see the Appendix and note 12). 
 
In the real wage model the supply of labor is a function of the real wage. The 
equilibrium is now at a lower output level and a higher DP , since the rise in 
the domestic goods price DP  causes the  curve it shift up by  , where 
 is the weight of domestic goods in the expenditure price index (see Eq. (8)), 
SW DbP
b
 8
the LM and IS curves shifting more to the left. It is worth noting, however, that 
in an open economy real wage model output does change in response to a 
change in effective demand if the supply of labor is specified as a function of 
the expenditure price, as is appropriate. 
 
Fiscal expansion shifts the IS curve outwards. Notional demand increases to 
the intersection of the new IS curve and the 
_
r  curve. If the demand for money 
is unaffected by the excess demand and La = 0, output is unchanged at Y0. If 
La < 0, the increased excess demand for goods reduces the quantity of 
money demanded and increases that supplied, and the kink in the LM curve 
moves to the intersection of the LM with the new IS curve. The steeper part of 
the LM curve now shifts outwards, intersecting with the 
_
r  curve at a higher 
output demand level. As the simultaneous adjustment of the demand and the 
supply side was discussed above, we need not revert to it here or in the 
following. 
 
Monetary expansion shifts the LM curve outwards, which expands output 
demand to the intersection of the new LM curve and the 
_
r  curve. It is thus 
particularly effective, expanding output demand in proportion to monetary 
expansion: there is no crowding out by the interest rate, which is fixed by the 
statutory ceiling. 
 
An increase in the ceiling rate causes the 
_
r  curve to rise, causing its 
intersection with the LM curve to move up along that curve, increasing output, 
as the quantity of money demanded declines and the quantity of money 
supplied increases (-Lr). In addition, the money supply also increases if 
capital flows are free (Kr). An increase in the interest rate also reduces the 
notional demand for goods so that the excess demand for goods declines. If 
La < 0, this increases the quantity of money demanded. In this case, the new 
equilibrium is found at the intersection of the steeper part of the LM curve with 
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the new 
_
r  curve. A rise in the ceiling rate is thus expansionary also in this 
case. 
 
B. The system after financial market liberalization 
 
After liberalization of the financial market, r is a free price so that equilibrium 
lies at the intersection of the IS and LM curves. The effects of fiscal and 
monetary expansion (outward shift of the IS curve and the LM curve, 
respectively) are standard: a rise in income and a trade balance deficit, the 
interest rate rising in response to fiscal, and declining in response to monetary 
expansion. Monetary expansion also leads to a balance of payments deficit, 
while fiscal expansion does likewise if the reduced-form LM curve is flatter 
than the BP curve (not shown) and vice versa (see the expression for 
 in the Appendix). As these effects are well known, a brief discussion 
may suffice. 
dGRd /∆
 
It is shown in the Appendix that only the trade balance response to 
devaluation is unambiguously positive. In the real wage model, domestic 
prices increase proportionately to the exchange rate so that price 
competitiveness cannot be improved by devaluation. Therefore devaluation 
normally has a contractionary effect on output by reason of a decline in the 
real value of nominal assets caused by a rise in the price level. The 
improvement in the trade balance is then based on the decline in income. In 
the money wage model income normally increases due to the expenditure-
switching effect of devaluation -- an additional condition for an unambiguous 
response being that the income elasticity of the demand for money is at least 
unity. The overall balance of payments improves in this model. 
 
C. The transition 
 
It is not enough to have a working system in the equilibrium before and after 
the reform; the system also has to work during the transition. Assuming that 
the interest rate ceiling is a binding constraint, its liberalization has an 
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expansionary effect on output, as shown. Secondly, liberalization of capital 
movements implies that Kr rises from zero to its generic value, which makes 
the LM curve flatter, and strengthens the output effect of the increase in 
interest rate. 
 
A number of prerequisites need to be met for the efficient working of the 
economy. In the Post-Washington Consensus, these are basically the 
assumptions behind the free market model, and concern macrostability, and 
liberalization of the labor, goods, and financial markets, and international 
capital movements (for the Washington Consensus, see e.g. McKinnon 
(1973), Shaw (1973), Williamson (1990), and World Bank (1991)). For 
example, firms need to be made transparent by imposing accounting and 
auditing standards so that market participants who initially do not have access 
to much information are more on a par with insiders. Antitrust issues need to 
be addressed as part of goods market liberalization so that the private rates of 
return on investment projects reflect their social rates of return rather than e.g. 
monopoly power. For financial institutions, an adequate framework of 
supervision and regulation is needed to deal with various aspects of moral 
hazard and adverse selection. 
 
Players in the economy need time to adjust to goods market liberalization. 
Too fast a liberalization brings about resource reallocation via bankruptcies 
rather than an orderly restructuring in the declining sectors. This is costly in 
that it leads to destruction of organizational and informational capital, and can 
put banks under pressure when the failing companies’ loans "turn sour". 
 
We may pass now to the financial markets. In terms of our model, the Post-
Washington Consensus handbook procedure can be described as follows. 
Assuming that the initial output level Y0 was optimal, one first liberalizes the 
domestic credit market and neutralizes its effect on output by fiscal, monetary 
and/or exchange rate policies so as to remain at Y0, then allows the economy 
to adjust. Firms need time to adjust their portfolios of stocks and flows. 
Especially banks which have their lending at the old ceiling rate find their 
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deposit and open market rates rising to the higher equilibrium level (unless 
the entire neutralization was accomplished by fiscal contraction), while 
interest earnings rise only as outstanding loans are repaid and new loans are 
granted. Government bond dealers, who have traditionally financed 99 % of 
their portfolios with debt, are also particularly vulnerable to sudden increases 
in interest rates. It thus generally takes time to establish what the equilibrium 
market rate is, let alone adjust to it. In short, interest rates must not rise much 
faster than the “norm” to which agents have been accustomed. 
 
Next one begins preparations for the liberalization of capital flows. The 
uncovered interest arbitrage condition requires that ( r − rF − e
• ε ) in the capital 
flow function (where  is the foreign market interest rate and Fr Ýe ε  the expected 
depreciation of the currency) be adequately small in absolute value in order 
for large disequilibrating capital inflows or outflows to be avoided (see Eqs. (2) 
and (3) in the Appendix). This is done by changing the policy mix. For 
example, if ( ) is positive, one tightens fiscal policy (or revalues or 
devalues the exchange rate, whichever is contractionary; see the Appendix), 
and relaxes monetary policy to bring the market interest rate close enough to 
international rates (plus expected depreciation), i.e. to make the IS and LM 
curves intersect at level , ( r
r − rF − e
• ε
0Y F + e
• ε ). (Chronologically this can of course in 
principle be coterminous with the repeal of the interest rate ceilings.) 
Thereafter one can liberalize capital movements to the extent found desirable. 
 
The handbook rule has been to let the economy adjust to the liberalization of 
the financial system before proceeding to the liberalization of capital flows. 
We now see when one can liberalize both markets simultaneously: the 
economy must be in an initial equilibrium where a) there is no (or not much) 
excess demand for credit and b) the equilibrium interest rate approximately 
equals the foreign rate plus the expected depreciation in the exchange rate. 
This may be a key reason why some countries, e.g. New Zealand, have got 
away with liberalizing both markets simultaneously contrary to the handbook 
rule (see e.g. Evans et al. (1996)). 
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If these conditions are not fulfilled, the penalty can be severe: If r > rF + e
• ε  
(plus the risk premium on the exchange rate), borrowers borrow from abroad, 
causing domestic credit expansion (see Eqs. (2) and (3), and Table 1). If r < 
, depositors switch their deposits abroad, causing credit contraction. rF + e
• ε
 
It is easy to see that liberalizing capital flows before the domestic financial 
system may also lead to credit expansion or contraction: The rationed 
borrower borrows from abroad if rS > rF + e
• ε  (plus the risk premium), where rS 
is the shadow interest rate. The non-rationed borrower does likewise if 
_
r  > 
. The depositor moves his deposits abroad if rF + e
• ε rF + e
• ε> r−. In the first two 
cases a credit expansion follows, and in the third case a credit contraction. If 
the first and third conditions hold simultaneously, part of the intermediation 
between domestic savers and investors moves to foreign banks. This appears 
to be what happened in the United States in the late ‘sixties in consequence 
of tight money in combination with Federal Reserve Regulation Q and interest 
rate ceilings on deposits in thrift institutions, and it was partly responsible for 
the strong expansion of the eurodollar market. 
 
3. THE EVENTS IN FINLAND: AN INTERPRETATION 
 
A. The “crazy years” and the collapse 
 
Finland’s price competitiveness eroded throughout the first half of the 1980’s 
due to substantial wage increases. It soon became evident that the country 
had problems with the current account of its balance of payments; in 1985, at 
the best point of its current account cycle, it barely attained equilibrium (Table 
1, Columns 4 and 5). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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A fatal error was made at the turn of 1986-87, when the Bank of Finland 
liberalized the domestic credit market without the preparatory measures 
discussed above. Namely, it simultaneously also liberalized international 
capital movements, starting with long-term foreign borrowing by 
manufacturing and shipping companies, and all borrowing through 
commercial banks. International interest rates (rF) were of the same order of 
magnitude as the repealed loan rate ceiling of 7 %, with e
• ε still close to zero. 
The Finnish shadow rate was, however, much higher, even the free Interbank 
overnight rate, the predecessor of the Helibor being 11.9 % at the end of 1986 
(Table 1, Column 7). The result was a massive capital inflow, leading to 
uncontrolled credit expansion. In 1987 alone, net capital imports grew by 
FIM27,5 billion, or by more than the entire monetary base (M-1). The change 
in the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves (∆R), which has the same 
effect as a change in its domestic bond portfolio (∆D) in Table 2 (see Eqs. (2) 
and (3) in the Appendix), was FIM15,7 billion, or 87 % of the monetary base. 
As a result, the Interbank overnight rate initially declined by 4 percentage 
points to 8 %, the annual average being one point higher (Table 1, Column 7). 
In the years 1987-89, the monetary base increased by 114 % in nominal 
terms (82 % in real terms), M1 by 28 % (9 %), M2 by 49 % (27 %), M3 by 60 
% (36 %), and domestic credit by 74 % (48 %). (Source: Bank of Finland 
Monthly Bulletin.)  This meant that bank loans, almost the only debt 
instruments available, increased from 55 % of the GDP in 1985 to 98 % in 
1990 (Drees et al. (1998)). Needless to say, an expansion of this size had to 
take place at the expense of credit quality. However, bankers’ risk 
assessment appears to have been affected by their past experience, when 
credit losses had been small: under interest rate ceilings they could choose 
the best risks. 
 
In terms of Figure 1, capital movements made the LM curve roughly horizontal 
at 
_
r  from point Y0 on, individuals now being able to finance their notional 
expenditures. Aggregate demand increased not to Y1 but to Y2 , which in turn 
sparked off a wage-price spiral. In consequence, stock prices and housing 
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prices almost doubled (Table 1, Columns 8,9). The higher asset prices 
increased the real net worth of households (V/PD), which increased 
expenditures and shifted the IS curve outwards, further fuelling the expansion, 
and financing was no longer an obstacle. The price increases caused 
expectations of further price rises, which reduced the real user cost of capital 
and fuelled further price rises. In 1987-1989, unemployment decreased from 
the 5 % level to 3.5 %, wage inflation accelerated from 6½ % to 9.6 % per 
annum, and price competitiveness deteriorated by 10 % (Table 1, Columns 
3,5,6,10). This reduced the market shares of export (and import competing) 
industries by 10 % (Eq. (3)).4 The current account deficit increased to 6.2 % 
of the GDP in 1989 (Table 1, Column 4).1 
 
The authorities were preoccupied with the expansionary effects of the terms 
of trade improvement (some 10 %): the oil price declined and the export 
prices of pulp and paper products increased. While the terms of trade (Table 
1, Column 11) may give the impression that all was well, examination of the 
market share of Finnish exports shows that the improvement was 
accompanied by losses of market share in export markets; much of the 
increase in export prices was due to cost increases and thus loss of 
competitiveness rather than foreign demand increase. Thus even if the terms 
of trade improvement had an expansionary effect, it was likely to be minor. 
(See also Bordes (1993), who finds the above expansionary effects of the 
terms of trade improvement unimportant.) 
 
The literature has, in our view, failed to appreciate the significance of capital 
flows, possibly because the percentage of foreign loans out of total credit was 
“only” in the teens (see e.g. Bordes et al. (1993)). It is important to note, 
however, that the appropriate yardstick is the monetary base, in which foreign 
loans cause an increase, all else being equal (see Eqs. (2) and (3)). Thus 
their quantitatively most substantial effect is likely to be the amount of 
domestic loans they make possible, given the excess demand for credit at a 7 
% interest rate. Thus while we agree with Bordes that the problem was on the 
supply side of the credit market, we submit that the main reason was capital 
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flows rather than the widening spread between the loan and deposit rates. 
Secondly, the literature has placed considerable emphasis on the factors 
causing the demand for credit to increase especially due to expectations of 
housing and stock price rises. This is, of course, likely to be true, but the initial 
situation was not equilibrium. In our view, most of the action was on the 
supply side of the credit market, whose binding constraint was relaxed. When 
the "floodgates opened" there was a great deal of potential demand to be 
satisfied". 
  
After repeated warnings, the authorities realized in the spring of 1989 that the 
balance of payments was out of control and that even its financing might 
encounter difficulties in the near future; the current account deficit had risen to 
more than 6 per cent of the GDP, and unit labor costs were more than 12 per 
cent above the OECD average (Table 1, Columns 4,5). Imports had thus to be 
reduced. Parliamentary elections were approaching, which made politicians 
unwilling to contract fiscal policy. The main thrust therefore fell on monetary 
policy. The Bank of Finland tightened this sharply and revalued the currency 
by 4 %. The tightening led to a greater rise in interest rates than if fiscal and 
exchange rate policies had been used relatively more. Indeed, the nominal 
Helibor rate increased by 6 percentage points to 16 % during three quarters, 
the rise during the last quarter alone being 4 points, and it persisted high for 
three years -- although this does not show in the annual averages or year-end 
values due to a strong seasonal (Table 1, Column 7). For many a debtor this 
meant a loan rate of 20 %.  Thus initially mainly only the LM curve shifted 
inwards, the IS curve shifting only marginally, until the wealth effect began to 
take hold. (The LM curve had become steeper due to the fact that there was 
now a risk premium associated with capital imports, which reduced Kr. In 
addition,  began to rise.) e
• ε
 
As suggested above, so drastic a tightening would probably have inflicted 
serious damage in the financial system even without the “crazy years”, during 
which banks had expanded loans by increased risk-taking; the bank 
loan/deposit ratio increased from 1.3 to 1.8 between 1985 and 1990. As has 
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been known for a long time, extreme caution should be exercised if interest 
rates are to be increased by much more than the “norm”. The latter was in this 
case determined by the fact that nominal interest rates had normally moved 
only by one percentage point up or down, the real rate being negative much of 
the time at least on an after-tax basis. Especially banks that had much of their 
lending at the old ceiling rate of 7 % found their deposit and open market 
rates suddenly rising to a much higher level. As a result, Finland had its 
SKOPbank and Savings banks debacle in the early 1990’s. The Savings bank 
sector, with 150 institutions and a loan market share of 25 % in 1990, shrank 
to 40 institutions with 4 % of the market in 1995, their nonperforming loans 
being transferred to the Government Guarantee Fund. Most of the rest of the 
banking sector was also approaching insolvency, and all the banks had to 
resort to state support, as will be elaborated below (see Drees et al. (1998)). It 
seems that this second deadly sin would alone have sufficed to bring the 
banking sector to its knees and lead to a banking crisis. 
 
The interest rate surprise was also shared by bank customers, who had 
borrowed heavily and had a vulnerable financial structure in terms not only of 
the quantity of debt but also of its uncovered interest rate and exchange rate 
exposure. In the meantime, the Bank of Finland had allowed the linking of 
loan rates to market rates, and banks had shifted the interest rate risk to their 
customers on certain types of loans. It was thus not only new borrowing but 
also outstanding loans which became more costly with the rise in market 
rates, and customers were clearly not prepared for this. They thus 
experienced a sharp unexpected rise in financing costs, while their cash flow 
shrank due to the demand effects of the tightening. Many businesses and 
households faced a financial crisis, this often leading to forced sales of 
collateral, and bankruptcies – in 1990-98 over 45 000 firms, or 21 % of the 
total collapsed (see Statistics Finland). Bankruptcies moreover are very 
costly, observing that much of a firm’s value consists in organizational and 
informational capital -- a network of individuals with implicit contracts between 
them, together with accumulated firm-specific know-how. The distress sales 
depressed market prices, which led to new collateral problems and further 
forced realizations. As a result, housing and stock prices collapsed to a half of 
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their 1989 level, or to a level preceding the “crazy years” (Table 1, Columns 
8,9). Sales of new dwellings, of course, came to a standstill, which was fatal 
for construction companies; with one exception, all the large companies either 
failed outright or had to be reorganized. 
 
Nor were households prepared. Their gross interest payments increased from 
5.5 % of disposable income in 1987 to almost 10 % in 1992 (see Drees et al. 
(1998)). The collapse of house prices added to their problems. Houses had 
hitherto been safe investments whose prices had moved mainly upwards, and 
a new house was bought before the old one was sold. Under interest rate 
ceilings, households would take out all the loans available at the then-
prevailing negative real loan rates, the bank loan officer acting as a brake on 
all expenditures. Now that financing was available, houses had been 
purchased with highly leveraged financing in the expectation that the value of 
the collateral would increase. However, beginning in 1989, the real loan rate 
was no longer negative. When the housing market collapsed, many 
households were caught in a two-house trap, with loans quickly exceeding the 
joint market value of the houses. The decline in asset prices led to a 
considerable decline in household real net worth, and 23 % of households ran 
into debt delinquencies. As a result, households reduced consumption, which 
further fuelled the downward spiral: the more loans they repaid the more they 
owed.2 
 
The GDP declined by 14 %, or 20 % below its potential level and remained at 
a depressed level for two years. Unemployment increased rapidly, its open 
variety hitting a peak of 18.4 % in 1994 (Table 1, Columns 1,3). Government 
finances deteriorated as tax revenues declined, unemployment benefits 
increased and, later, the cost of bank support, currently evaluated at 10 % of 
the GDP, increased (the mere fiscal cost being 7.5 %; see Nyberg and 
Vihriälä (1994)). This led the government to increase taxes! So deep a 
depression made the subsequent recovery slower, since organizations had 
been destroyed in bankruptcies, and capacity had to be built with normal 
growth subject to all financial and other constraints. In a recession, in 
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contrast, only the capacity utilization rate declines, and production can then 
be increased much faster. Thus in the former case the NAIRU rises. 
 
For the banks debt defaults were a severe blow, and they were already in 
serious difficulties by reason of steeply higher deposit and free market rates. 
For example, nonperforming loans in 1992 constituted 9.3 % of bank 
exposure after 3.7 % had been written off as loan and guarantee losses; 
some 50 % of banks’ real estate and construction exposure was either written 
off or nonperforming (Drees et al. (1998)). A banking crisis ensued. The 
financial crisis had followed the classical textbook pattern - rise in interest 
rates - decline in asset values - deterioration of banks’ balance sheets - 
increase in uncertainty - increasing moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems - balance of payments crisis - the decline in the GDP, which 
accentuates the above problems, leading to its further decline (see e.g. 
Mishkin (2001)).3 
 
A bank panic was averted when the authorities first gave oral guarantees and 
established a Government Guarantee Fund, which injected capital resources 
into banks in the form of subordinated loans. All the banks took advantage of 
the offer. Finally, in February 1993, Parliament passed a resolution 
guaranteeing bank deposits “under all circumstances”. This would have 
sufficed to avert a bank panic in credibly satisfying the depositor that deposits 
were safe. However, the Fund also passed a resolution to the effect that bank 
share prices would not be allowed to fall to zero. This price guarantee 
amounted to a potentially considerable wealth transfer to the shareholders of 
banks, although the subsequent increase in bank share prices (partly due to 
the guarantee) made the guarantee redundant. No other measures were 
taken in the financial system, which made possible the continuation of 
activities motivated by moral hazard and adverse selection and increased the 
cost of the crisis.4 
 
A financial crisis generally leads to debt deflation if an unexpected decline in 
price level takes place - asset prices had already declined. A price level 
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decline increases the real interest rate and induces agents to reduce their 
consumption and investment in order to service their debts, especially given 
the fact that the market value of their net worth had declined. This further 
depresses economic activity and perpetuates the vicious circle. Indeed, 
producer prices in manufacturing declined by 0.6 percent in 1991, rising by 2 
per cent in 1992. This needs to be examined in the light of the fact that price 
indices, in not taking into account improvement in the quality of goods, 
exaggerate price inflation by 0.8-1.6 % per year, as argued by the Boskin 
Commission (1996) (see Table 1, Column 2). The government’s policy of 
fiscal correction, initiated after the 1991 election, made matters worse by 
further reducing the private sector’s cash flow, although this was at first 
necessary because of the balance of payments crisis. The behavior and 
statements of executives in the private sector referred to classical debt 
deflation behavior in the early 1990’s: the emphasis was on correcting the 
financial ratios of the balance sheet. 
 
In addition, there were signs of a credit crunch when banks tightened their 
collateral requirements, though the empirical evidence is mixed (see Vihriälä 
(1997) and Pazarbasioğlu (1997)). It appears that, in leaving the country 
hovering on the brink of debt deflation for years, the authorities failed to 
adequately appreciate the danger of, and the potential damage caused by, 
debt deflation. The attempt at a deflationary solution in the fall of 1991 
strengthens this impression. We will return to this issue shortly. 
 
Bordes (1993) regards the excessive exposure of banks and their customers 
to interest rate and credit risks as a key reason for the depression. This was 
indubitably the case, given the size of the interest rate rise. We would submit, 
however, that the reason for the exposure lay in expectations, which should 
be treated as given in policy design. This turns the issue to the converse; 
given the expectations of relatively stable nominal interest rates, stable 
growth, and mainly rising housing prices which agents must have entertained, 
based on their experience, the reason was the suddenness and size of the 
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interest rate rise, which was far beyond anything they had experienced in the 
past. 
 
The authorities pointed to the collapse of the Soviet Union as the main factor 
responsible for the depression. However, Finnish exports there had been 
declining since 1982, and this trend continued during the “crazy years”. After 
the collapse in 1991, Finnish exports there declined by 6 % of total exports in 
each of two consecutive years. Together they amounted to 2 % of Finland’s 
GDP. (See Bordes (1993).) The “Western recession” has been mentioned as 
another culprit. However, rate of the growth in industrial production in 
Finland’s Western export partners was zero or marginally below zero for two 
years, and after the devaluations Finland’s exports grew briskly. In our view, it 
would not have been difficult for Finland to manage disturbances this 
magnitude in its normal condition. (This view is shared by Bordes, Currie, and 
Söderström (1993).) 
 
It is worth adding that in 1990-93 exports had an expansionary effect on the 
GDP, except in 1991, when it was -1.5 %. Public sector demand was 
expansionary in 1990-91 and contractionary in 1992-93. The major 
contractionary demand component was private demand (mainly due to fiscal 
and monetary policies), whose effect was in the range of -1.5 % to -6.1 %. 
(See Kiander and Vartia (1996)). Of this, the contribution of private investment 
was –5.5 % in 1991 (see Jonung et al. 1996). 
 
B. Devaluation 
 
Late in 1991, the Bank of Finland still maintained the parity to which the 
currency had been revalued in 1989. It had resisted demands to devalue the 
currency in connection with the linking of the mark to the ECU in June. This 
position was in our view, however, well taken. The trade unions, namely, then 
demanded that real wages must not be reduced, i.e. the country was still in a 
real wage model, where price competitiveness cannot be improved by 
devaluation (except possible temporarily), as shown in the Appendix. 
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In November, faced with a deteriorating unemployment situation, the unions 
talked only of (nominal) wages. This implies that ρ = 0 and the country was in 
a money wage model, where Ee = 0 and Te = TPD/e, i.e. devaluation 
improved price competitiveness and was expansionary (at least if 1≥⋅YLη ; see 
the Appendix), improving the trade balance by expenditure switching rather 
than expenditure reduction. At the end of the month, a last-ditch attempt was 
made to effect an “internal devaluation” by a negotiated settlement where 
nominal wages were to be cut by 5 per cent. Fortunately this failed, since it 
might have pushed the country (deeper) into debt deflation. Shortly thereafter, 
market forces obliged the central bank to float the currency (and fix it at a 12 
% lower level the following day) with almost ideal timing – only the 
Metalworkers’ Union elections a month later caused some inconvenience. 
Without devaluation the combination of an overvalued currency and high 
interest rates would most likely have inflicted serious additional damage. 
 
A new floating of the same order of magnitude took place in September 1992. 
Thereafter the Bank of Finland kept the interest rate at almost 18 %, 
responding to demands for relaxation with the argument that this would lead 
to further depreciation of the currency. As is well known, however, this would 
happen only if capital flows were perfectly elastic to the interest rate (Kr -> ∞) 
and the expected depreciation of the mark (e
• ε ) had remained unaffected by 
the depreciation which had already taken place.5 When the Central Bank was 
publicly apprised of these conditions, it quickly relaxed monetary policy, and 
the Helibor declined by 5 percentage points (Table 1, Column 7). Of course, 
there was no pressure on the exchange rate. 
 
These devaluations caused many borrowers unexpected problems. About a 
half of corporate borrowing from Finnish banks in the late 1980’s was 
denominated in foreign currency, and the banks financed this with foreign 
borrowing as explained above (see Drees et al. (1998)). Almost a half of this 
borrowing was by the closed sector, which believed the Central Bank 
Governor’s assurances that the exchange rate would be held unchanged. It 
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typically had no cover for its foreign exchange exposure. Faced with declining 
credit ratings, the banks found refinancing of their foreign debt ever more 
difficult, and had to resort to ever shorter maturities. Early in 1993, the banks 
forced their customers to convert their foreign currency-linked loans into 
domestic currency loans at the worst possible moment after the second 
devaluation. This all but maximized their cost, as the mark was at its nadir, 
whence it subsequently appreciated. Many customers had evaluated the cost 
of the foreign currency-denominated loans by distributing the cost of a 
possible devaluation over the entire maturity, when the possible exchange 
rate loss would have been in reasonable relation to the interest rate spread. 
Of course, many customers’ exchange risks turned into their banks’ credit 
risks, as many of these loans turned sour in the banks’ portfolios. (For a 
theoretical treatment, see Aghion et al. (2001).) 
 
On the real side, the fundamental situation had now altered especially as the 
collective wage agreements made in connection with the exchange rate 
adjustments were moderate, reflecting the money wage model. It would, 
however, take a few quarters before the newly-won competitiveness showed 
in foreign trade, output and employment. In the meantime, if policy-makers 
had sought to minimize the damage caused by bankruptcies, they would have 
tried to stimulate, rather than contract the depressed economy within the limits 
determined by the financing possibilities of the current account deficit and by 
refinancing maturing debt.6 
 
Unfortunately, the opposite took place. As seen from Table 1, Column 12, 
discretionary fiscal policy, as expressed by the Blanchard measure, tightened 
considerably during and after 1991 and remained relatively tight thereafter, 
with no consistent pattern (see Honkapohja et al. (1999), and Alesina and 
Perotti (1995)). Reduction of the fiscal deficit by fiscal contraction was the 
supreme target of fiscal policy during the early 1990’s, and it fuelled the 
downward spiral. As the deficit increased due to deteriorating business 
conditions, the government increased taxes and reduced expenditure, 
causing business conditions to deteriorate further, this in turn increasing 
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unemployment and unemployment benefits, and bankruptcies (Table 1, 
Column 3). The latter led to debt defaults, which led to new defaults, thereby 
further aggravating the banking crisis. It is possible that during the depression, 
tax increases, in contracting economic activity, led to an increase in the level 
of the fiscal deficit in addition to the damage it caused in the economy. In any 
case, they were likely to increase the public debt-GDP ratio (see Ahtiala 
(2000)).7  
 
All in all, it is difficult to see how the effect could have been worth the cost, 
especially as it should have been evident that a substantial improvement in 
the trade balance, and thus economic activity, was under way thanks to the 
exchange rate adjustments. It is worth adding that the central government 
debt, and Finland's net foreign liabilities, peaked at less than 65 % of the 
GDP. (However, see Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), (1995), Karras (1994), 
Bertola et al. (1993), and Ahtiala (1998).)8 
 
It is in general less painful to carry out contractionary structural adjustments 
such as fiscal correction by first "putting the house in order". This would make 
it possible to avoid the unnecessary bankruptcies of firms strong enough to 
survive the adverse effects of either the adjustment or the depression but not 
both. Now monetary policy remained tight until late 1995 (Table 1, Column 7). 
Up to 1993 the tightness could be defended first in view of the current account 
situation (since the objective was to contract aggregate demand and thereby 
imports, and soften the unions to the money wage model in preparation for 
devaluation) and then calm foreign creditors. Since late 1993 it cannot, in our 
view, be defended on these grounds. In fact, interest rates were increased in 
the fall of 1995, when they were at the 6 per cent level. A small increase was 
appropriate as a message to the trade unions negotiating a new collective 
wage agreement, but in our view the initial level was too high, given the 
unemployment situation, the number of bankruptcies and the fiscal policy 
stance. The tightening appears to have been responsible for the subsequent 
slowdown of economic growth. 
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The Bank of Finland answered the above criticism by saying that it was 
interested only in inflation, which of course is an important – and fashionable 
– target especially with an eye to price competitiveness. However, this should 
not be the only target in the presence of supply shocks and mass 
unemployment: In a broad class of models besides this, optimal policy 
consists in perfectly offsetting demand shocks and perfectly accommodating 
shocks to potential output (see e.g. Clarida et al. (1999)). After all, price 
stability is a means to stable output growth, not an independent end. Besides, 
the more acute threat was then deflation, especially given the above bias in 
price indices. If tight money was an investment in the central bank’s credibility 
as an inflation-fighter, it was a costly one with unfortunate timing. In 1996, 
interest rates were cut to the 3 per cent level, though longer rates remained 
higher, and no acceleration of inflation followed.9 
 
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
We have derived the theoretical conditions for a successful financial reform 
with a simple open economy model, and then examined the Finnish reform in 
the light of our results. We emphasized the importance of giving the economy 
enough time to adjust after the removal of interest rate ceilings. Thereafter the 
domestic interest rate should be aligned with foreign rates by changing the 
policy mix, and finally, international capital flows can be liberalized. The two 
markets can be liberalized simultaneously if there is initially no excess 
demand for credit and the domestic interest rate is roughly equal to the 
foreign rate plus the expected depreciation of the currency. 
 
The experience of Finland shows how serious the consequences of a badly 
executed reform can be. The matter can be summarized as follows. In 1986-
87, the general interest rate ceilings were abolished simultaneously with the 
liberalization of international capital flows, when the domestic shadow interest 
rate was considerably higher than international rates. The reform was, 
moreover, carried out without appropriate preparations with respect to the 
reform of accounting and auditing standards and a framework of supervision 
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and regulation of financial institutions. The liberalization caused the monetary 
base and the stock of domestic credit almost to double in three years due to 
the ensuing capital inflows. The outcome was the “crazy years”, during which 
housing and stock prices roughly doubled and general inflation accelerated, 
causing a serious erosion of price competitiveness. 
 
In 1989, it was realized that the current account was out of control. Instead of 
a coordinated tightening of fiscal and monetary policies, the Bank of Finland 
sharply tightened monetary policy, the short-term interest rate increasing by 6 
percentage points to 16 % in three quarters, the rise during the last quarter 
alone being 4 points. It seems that such a measure would have sufficed to 
cause severe damage not only in the banking sector but also in the real sector 
even without the “crazy years”, which had left banks’ customers vulnerable 
with a weak financial structure. When the economy was in a "free fall" as a 
result, fiscal policy was tightened (2-3 years too late), which, combined with 
tight money and an overvalued exchange rate, deepened the decline. Various 
other fiscal and monetary policy measures had a similar effect.  
 
In 1991 and 1992 price competitiveness was restored with devaluations 
combined with moderate collective wage agreements. Even after these had 
been executed, domestic policies were kept unduly tight. This continued the 
decline despite the fact that the fundamental situation had been corrected and 
its effect would be felt in a matter of a few quarters. 
 
Was anything done right? There were in our view three successful operations. 
The inevitable devaluations, combined with the collective wage agreements 
made in connection with them, can be regarded as successful. The same can 
be said of the failure to devalue in June 1991, when the country was still in the 
real wage model. Finally, the decision to guarantee bank deposits was 
instrumental in averting a bank panic. 
 
The basic lesson to be learnt from this sequence of events should be clear: 
economic policy especially in connection with economic reform is difficult, and 
carrying one out without mastering it can inflict serious damage on the 
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economy. A great deal of work remains to be done in Finland’s (and in many 
other countries’) reform, and there are dangerous pitfalls also in its future 
stages. Individual measures should not be carried out without regard to 
processes ongoing in the rest of the economy. 
 
Another lesson is that the micro level rules of thumb, such as that on a 
“healthy” debt-equity ratio, are a function of economic conditions in the long 
run. If the country has had a long period of sustained rapid growth, and stable 
nominal interest rates, often implying negative real after-tax rates and mainly 
rising housing prices, an adverse deviation from these conditions, greater 
than the “norm” can activate non-linearities and have more serious 
consequences than econometric models based on the old regime would 
predict. Under these conditions, the policy-maker has to underwrite the 
trusting behavior of the private sector if he is to avoid the serious 
consequences of a suddenly deteriorating macroeconomic performance. This 
point, well understood by the Federal Reserve Board (as witnessed by the 
“Greenspan put”), appears to be of relevance to the crisis in East Asia. 
 
What lessons would these findings offer for China today? China has 
implemented reform fairly well according to the handbook. Nonetheless there 
are risks. The reform of accounting, prudential and regulatory standards has 
only just begun, and practical bankers are learning the principles of risk 
analysis and modern bank management. If liberalization of the credit markets 
is carried out without considerable progress in these issues, banks are likely 
to find themselves in serious difficulties. (Bank loan rates have already been 
freed, but a large proportion of investment spending is subject to strict 
selective credit controls.) Specifically, the banks' problem loan portfolios, still 
estimated at a quarter of the total, need to be cleaned up. Up till now, banks 
have received over 260 billion dollars in terms of direct handouts and 
unloading of bad loans to state-backed companies. The WTO rules call for 
China to open its banking market from the end of 2006. This is a challenging 
deadline.  
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Schemes to create consumer finance companies bring to the market loan 
applicants who have previously had no access to credit. This is likely to 
reduce precautionary saving, whereas the partial "privatization" of health, 
pension, and education expenses works in the opposite direction. If the former 
dominates, the IS curve shifts outwards. This may put the central bank's 
ability to control bank lending under pressure – consumer loans already 
constitute a quarter of all new lending. Finally, there have been suggestions 
that international capital movements be liberalized now, i.e. before the 
domestic credit market liberalization has been completed and market rates 
aligned. It is easy to see where this would lead, especially given the 
expectations of an appreciation of the yuan. 
 
APPENDIX: THE MODEL 
 
We will analyze a small open economy, with exogenous foreign goods prices 
and foreign interest rate. The foreign demand curve for domestically produced 
goods is negatively sloped. As we are interested in the intermediate-term 
effects of economic policy, we can carry out the analysis in a comparative-
static flow equilibrium framework. We have: 
 
Y = E * Y+ ,r−,V+ /P
D( )+ T * E− *,PD /− e( )+ G − A = E Y+ ,r−, e(−)( )+ T Y− ,e+( )+ G − A (1) 
 
M ≡ M−1 + ∆D + ∆R = L * PDY /P+ ,r−,a−( )P = L Y+ ,r−,a− ,e+( ) (2) 
∆R = T *(E− *,P
D /−e)P
D + K(r+− rF − e
• ε ) = T(Y− ,e+)P
D + K(r+− rF − e
• ε) (3) 
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 28
 
D
N
D PYW =  (7) 
 
),( ++= PNWW
S  (8) 
 
DS WW =  (9) 
 
Equation (1) represents aggregate demand for the domestic good and is the 
sum of private expenditures (E*), the trade balance (T*), and government 
expenditures (G), minus the amount of total demand eliminated by credit 
rationing (A), all in terms of the domestic good, and equal to total output (Y). 
Expenditures are a function of income, the domestic interest rate (r) and real 
wealth (V/PD, where V is nominal wealth and PD the domestic good price). 
The trade balance is specified as a function of expenditures, imports being 
functionally part of total expenditure. This deviates from the conventional 
specification with only income as argument. This specification implies that all 
of an expenditure change, induced by a change in the interest rate or real 
wealth, falls on domestic goods, whereas that caused by an income change 
falls on both domestic and imported goods. The other argument in the trade 
balance function is the real exchange rate, where (e) is the price of foreign 
currency in terms of domestic currency. Foreign goods prices are fixed at 
unity. The signs below the arguments refer to the assumed signs of the 
partials. As to A, when the interest rate ceiling is effective, A is the excess 
demand for goods at the ceiling rate, and it is rationed out by credit rationing 
by banks. The A is thus the part of “credit rationing” due to the fact that the 
interest rate is rationed below its equilibrium value. When the interest rate is 
at its market-clearing level, notional demand equals effective demand and A is 
zero. We will later return to the quasi-reduced forms on the right. 
 
Eq. (2) is the money market equation. The nominal money supply M equals its 
value at the end of the previous period M-1 plus the change in the central 
bank’s foreign exchange reserves (∆R) and in its bond portfolio (∆D). Since 
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cash is held to buy both domestic and imported goods, but not exported 
goods, real balances (M/P) have to be defined in terms of the expenditure 
price (P), as is widely accepted. However, income in the money demand 
function (L*) has then to be in terms of the same goods, since otherwise 
velocity would not be a pure number, as first proposed in Ahtiala (1984). The 
other arguments are the interest rate r, and a. The a is the difference between 
the equilibrium interest rate and the ceiling rate 
−
r  under general interest rate 
ceilings and it is thus the interest rate equivalent of the excess demand for 
credit, as expressed in Eq. (5). The La (the partial of L with respect to a) is 
smaller than Lr in absolute value, because rationed borrowers constitute only 
part of those demanding cash balances. Note that we have incorporated bank 
portfolio optimization and the credit expansion multiplier in the L function, so 
that the interpretation of M is the monetary base, and  and  also include 
the partials (except capital flows 
rL aL
K ) of the money supply function with respect 
to r and a, respectively. 
 
Equation (3) states that the balance of payments is the sum of the nominal 
trade balance and capital flows (K), where the latter are a function of the 
difference between the domestic interest rate and the sum of the exogenous 
foreign interest rate and the expected depreciation of the exchange rate . (e
• ε)
 
In Eq. (4), the expenditure price is a weighted average of domestic and 
foreign goods prices. 
 
On the supply side, Eq. (6) is the production function, where output is a 
function of the given capital stock (C) and employment (N). In Eq. (7) the 
demand wage WD equals the value of the marginal product of labor, YN being 
the partial of Y with respect to N. The supply wage WS in Eq. (8) is a function 
of employment and the expenditure price: rational labor is concerned with its 
real wage in terms of the goods it buys, not of those it produces. Eq. (9) is the 
equilibrium condition for the labor market. We will refrain from treating 
unemployment explicitly in order to limit the number of cases and to keep the 
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discussion brief. Of course, if the equilibrium wage is below the actual wage, 
there is unemployment and the output at the equilibrium wage is not achieved. 
We get from Eqs. (4), and (6) through (9), by total differentiation and 
substitution: 
 
 
dPD = θ d+ Y + ρ d(+)e  , (10) 
 
where θ ≡ W+ N −Y− NN
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ /Y+ N Y+ N − bW+ P
S⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ;
ρ ≡ 1− b( )WPS / Y+ N− bW+ PS( )= 0 in money wage model1 i n real wage model{
 
and YNN is the second derivative of Y with respect to N. Diminishing returns 
make it negative. 
 
In the multipliers of Eq. (10), the value of WPS, i.e. the supply side 
specification, has a key role. Examine the real wage model, where the supply 
of labor is a function of the real wage. Equation (8) obtains the form: WS = 
W(N)·P so that we get from Eqs.(7) through (9): 
 
( ) NSP YNWW ==  (11) 
 
It will be seen that the denominators in Eq. (10) are strictly positive, keeping θ  
positive and finite both in this and in the money wage model, with WPS = 0. 
This produces the often neglected fact that the classical dichotomy breaks 
down in an open economy, making the model simultaneous, with a rising 
aggregate supply curve. It is also worth noting that in the real wage model  
1=ρ : price competitiveness cannot be improved by devaluation. 
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The initial values of e, PD and thereby P are set at unity by an appropriate 
choice of units. Since the period in question was basically one of fixed 
exchange rates, this regime is examined. 
 
Substituting Eqs. (4) and (10) into Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) yields their quasi-
reduced forms, shown on the right, in Y, r or A, ∆R, and exogenous variables. 
There, we have simplified the trade balance equation by ignoring the effects 
of r on T through expenditures. This leaves the qualitative conclusions 
unaffected.  
 
Most of the new partials are unambiguous, as can be seen from footnotes 10, 
11 and 12, where the partials have been derived and interpreted. EY in 
Equation (1) is assumed to remain positive and smaller than one partly 
because of the wealth effect. The Ee is negative in the real wage model and 
zero in the money wage model.10 TY is negative. Te, LY and Le are 
positive.11, 12 
 
During the period under study Finland had two policy regimes. Until 1986, the 
country had general interest ceilings with capital flows subject to licensing.  In 
this regime, the ceiling interest rate is a policy variable and A endogenous. 
Effective demand at that interest rate is notional demand, minus the amount A 
which is rationed by bank credit rationing. In addition to r ,  and K are 
monetary policy instruments. 
D∆
 
In 1986-87, both the interest ceilings and restrictions on capital flows were 
dismantled. In this regime, r and K are endogenous and A is zero. The Y, r 
and R∆  being at their market clearing levels, notional demand equals 
effective demand. 
 
Totally differentiating the model of equations (1), (2), and (3), we get matrix 
equation (12) for the interest ceiling case, observing that T = 0 in the initial 
stationary state equilibrium. Eq. (13) is the corresponding equation for the 
general case. The former (latter) equilibrium is stable, assuming that excess 
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demand on the goods market leads to a rise in excess demand (output), that 
on the money market to a fall in output (rise in the interest rate), and a 
balance of payments surplus to an increase in foreign exchange reserves, as 
the reader can readily verify. 
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We obtain the following policy effects under interest rate ceilings from Eq. 
(12): 
 
( )[ ] ( ){ },1
1
drEaLLKdeTEaLLTDddGaL
D
dY rAarreeAaeeAa −−++−−+∆+−=  (14) 
 
 
( ) ([ ]{ ++−−+−∆=∆ drTEzKaLTLKLdGaLDdT
D
Rd YrrAaYrrYAaY
1
1 )  (15) 
 
          ( )[ ]{ }deTETEaLTLTL YYEeAaYeeY }+−−−+ 1   , 
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where   ,01 >−+−≡ YYAa TLazLD
 
            ( ) ( ) .0// >−−−≡ rrrYYA EzLKTLa  
 
Eq. (14) shows that this is a regime with monetarist properties; policies affect 
output only to the extent that they affect the demand for or supply of money. 
Thus monetary expansion is highly effective, its output impact being 
proportional to the change in the money supply, and the balance of payments 
change the marginal propensity to import multiplied by the change in income. 
Fiscal expansion is ineffective if the demand for (and supply of) money is not 
a function of the excess demand for credit ( )0=aL , only the excess demand 
for credit increasing by the change in government expenditures, which thus 
crowd out private expenditures dollar for dollar. If the demand for money is a 
function of the excess demand for credit, the output change is proportional to 
the change in the demand for money. The balance of payments change is the 
income change multiplied by the marginal propensity to import. Finally, an 
increase in the ceiling interest rate has an expansionary effect on output. As 
the intuitive explanation is given in the text, we will not repeat it here. 
 
The policy effects under market-determined interest rates are displayed in 
Table 2. There  is positive, as became evident in the foregoing discussion 
on stability. The effects of fiscal and monetary expansion are standard: a rise 
in income and a trade balance deficit, the interest rate rising in response to 
fiscal, and declining in response to monetary expansion. Monetary expansion 
also leads to a balance of payments deficit, while fiscal expansion does 
likewise if the reduced-form LM curve is flatter than the BP curve 
 and vice versa. As these effects are well known, we can 
keep the discussion brief. 
2D
( 0<− YrrY TLKL )
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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However, only the trade balance response to devaluation is unambiguous and 
positive. As to dY/de, in the real wage model the numerator of the expression 
equals (Kr-Lr)(1+TE)Ee + Er(Le-TEEe), where Le = L* (see note14). The L* is 
normally a large number compared to TEEe, which makes the second term 
normally negative. Since the first term is also negative, devaluation is 
normally contractionary in the real wage model. In the money wage model the 
numerator equals (Kr-Lr)Te + Er(Le-Te), where Le = (1-b)L*(1-ηL·Y), with 
ηL·Y the income elasticity of the demand for money (see note 12). The first 
term in the numerator being positive, the numerator and the expression are 
unambiguously positive if the income elasticity of the demand for money 
exceeds or equals unity. Otherwise the direction of the effect of devaluation 
depends on parameter values. 
 
d R/de, or the balance of payments response to exchange rate adjustments, 
is composed of the interaction of the same factors. The first two terms in the 
numerator are positive. A sufficient condition for devaluation to improve the 
balance of payments is that either Te ≥ ⎜Ee ⎢, or the third term is non-
negative. The former condition holds in the money wage model so that in this 
model devaluation improves the balance of payments. However, the opposite 
inequality holds in the real wage model, where Te = TEEe. In the real wage 
model, then, the sufficient condition for 
∆
0Rd >∆  is that the BP curve be no 
steeper than the LM curve. It is worth noting, however, that even if the 
balance of payments effect of devaluation is favorable, in the real wage model 
( 1= )ρ  it is based on a decline in output: one cannot improve the country’s 
competitiveness by devaluation, but domestic goods prices increase 
proportionally to the exchange rate, given the level of output. 
 
Any one of the other exogenous variables can, of course, disturb the 
equilibrium, e.g. PF, rF, W0S or ρ, and T0.  We will not discuss these at 
length, as they did not play a key role in the events under consideration. 
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Notes 
 
*This paper is based on Ahtiala (1993) and (1997). The research is part of the 
project “Finland’s economic crisis: background, events, and lessons”, 
supported by the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation. I wish to thank Michael Connolly 
and anonymous referees for useful comments. Financial support from the 
Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
1. The Bank of Finland blamed the crazy years on the tax deductibility of 
interest expenses. However, interest expenses had been deductible from time 
immemorial, and deductibility had been restricted in the 1980’s, not the 
reverse. The point is that if a large excess demand for credit is suddenly 
satisfied, a substantial boom follows, and the deductibility of interest expenses 
is likely to play a marginal role with disturbances of this size (see e.g. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)). 
 
2. The average indebtedness of the household sector remained fairly 
reasonable in relation to its assets: in 1987-89 the market value of assets 
increased by 61 % and liabilities by 73 %, so that liabilities rose from 12.6 % 
of assets to 13.6 %. In 1989-92, assets declined by 22 %, while liabilities were 
roughly unchanged, which increased the ratio to 17.3 %. Of course these 
averages conceal a large variance. See Jonung et al. (1996). 
 
3. Bank loan officers must, of course, have shared the expectations of relative 
stability. In a depression of this magnitude, many an acceptable credit risk 
turns bad because the decline in the economy affects the profitability of 
investments. This is thus not necessarily a sign of excessive ex ante risk-
taking. 
 
4. For example, the old bank management was allowed to continue. It faced a 
one-way bet: It had an incentive to extend loans to problem customers even 
at a negative expected interest rate to prevent their loans from surfacing as 
non-performing. In the best case, the customers would turn around with 
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general business conditions and in the worst the management could buy time 
and hold its position longer rather than risk immediate dismissal. 
 
5. The uncovered interest parity condition, implying perfect capital mobility: 
 Adding and subtracting the forward premium of the currency (f) 
yields:  The first expression in this equation is the 
covered interest arbitrage condition. The interpretation of the second 
expression is the risk premium of the currency. Expected depreciation in the 
expression for the risk premium can hardly be expected to be unaffected by  a 
credible devaluation. The domestic interest rate can then be reduced after the 
devaluation. 
r − rF − e
• ε= 0.
(r − rF − f) + (f − e
• ε) = 0.
 
6. The terms of trade also deteriorated. The first 5 percentage points from the 
peak in 1990 was genuine. Much of the subsequent 5 points in 1991-92 
appears to be associated with the devaluations, when Finland recaptured part 
of its lost market share (Table 1, Columns 10,11). It is thus a mirror image of 
the development during the “crazy years”.  
 
7. The government carried out several reforms, timing them in a way that 
deepened the depression. For example, the tax deductibility of interest 
expenses on housing loans was restricted considerably, which reduced the 
demand for housing and further depressed housing prices. A worsening of 
(defined) pension benefits was made public, which gave all those who had the 
choice a strong incentive to retire before the benefits were cut. Increases in 
contributions to (defined benefit) pension plans, along with many other taxlike 
fees, may in the long run have been necessary, but not when unemployment 
was close to 20 per cent. 
 
8. Note, however, that fiscal policy should be examined in the context of the 
state of economy and other policy measures: part of the tightening in 1991 
can be defended as a means of cutting imports and softening labor unions to 
the money wage model in preparation for devaluation. Since the middle of 
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1993, it is difficult to see any defence for the tightness, given the level of 
unemployment. 
 
9. The Bank of Finland answered the demands for lower interest rates by 
arguing that such a move would cause the long rates to rise. However, the 
dominant link between the rates is arbitrage, due to which short and long 
rates are generally positively correlated. A necessary condition for monetary 
relaxation to lead to a rise in long rates is that the rise in expected inflation 
dominates the downward effect due to arbitrage. This is rare except under a 
high level of employment. Under mass unemployment it is most unlikely. 
 
 
10. The expression for the change in expenditures reads: 
 
VdeEdrEdYVEEdE DD PVrPVY ρθ * )/(** )/(* )( −+−=  (B1) 
 
 
The multiplier of dY, which is the new EY, is the marginal propensity to spend 
adjusted for the wealth effect. Ando and Modigliani (1963) have obtained a 
value of .06 for E*(V/PD). The Ee is the marginal effect of the exchange rate 
on expenditures through the wealth effect. It is negative in the real wage 
model (r = 1) and zero in the money wage model (r = 0). 
 
11. We get from Eq. (1): 
 
deET
bWY
WYTdYTETdT eES
PN
S
PN
ePePYE DD )()(
**
)/(
*
)/(
* −−
−−+= θ  (B2) 
 
The multiplier of dY, or TY is negative, since both its terms are negative, 
T*(PD/e) being negative if the Marshall-Lerner condition holds. The Te is 
composed of the expenditure-switching effect and the expenditure-reducing or 
augmenting effect (the effect, on imports, of the exchange rate via real wealth 
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and thereby expenditures). The  is positive in the money wage model (WPS 
= 0; Ee = 0; see the Appendix) if T*PD/e < 0, and in the real wage model (YN 
= WPS; Ee < 0) by reason of the wealth effect. 
eT
 
12. We get from Eq. (2), as above: 
 
d(LP) = θ (1− b)LY* Y + bL *[ ]+ LY*{ dY}  (B3) 
 
          +Lr* dr + 1− bYN − bWPS
L*YN − (YN −WPS )LY* Y[ ]de. 
 
LY is the partial of the demand for nominal balances with respect to income 
and is positive. Le is the corresponding partial with respect to the exchange 
rate. It is positive in the real wage model. In the money wage model it is 
positive, zero or negative depending on whether the income elasticity of the 
demand for money is smaller than, equal to or greater than unity. 
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Table 1. Finland's Depression in Figures 
 
 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Y
•
 CPI
•⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ U  CA /Y   CL W
•
 r  S  PH  XF /Mo TT  BFI  
 
1986 2 2.9 5.4 -1 92 6.6 11.9 38.7 492 96 111 -0.4 
1987 6.9 4.2 5.1 -2.1 95 7.4 9.2 59.0 550 95 116 +2.6 
1988 4.7 5.0 4.6 -3.0 103 8.8 8.5 93.4 749 92 119 -2.3 
1989 5.4 6.6 3.5 -6.2 112 9.6 10.2 124.1 915 87 123 -1.3 
1990 0 6.1 3.4 -6.7 116 9.1 10.6 132.5 859 86 120 +1.5 
1991 -14 4.3 7.6 -5.6 112 6.1 14.9 100.0 733 81 118 +4.0 
1992 5 2.1 13.1 -4.8 95 2.1 13.3 73.1 599 85 113 +1.8 
1993 -1 1.1 17.9 -1.0 88 1.5 7.7 68.9 556 93 106 -4.3 
1994 3.8 0.35 18.4 +1.4 95 4.5 4.4 116.3 592 94 111 -1.2 
1995 4.6 0.3 17.2 +4.5 105 7.0 5.3 179.5 598 92 119 -1.8 
1996 3.5 0.4 16.3 +4.3 101 3.3 3.7 199.0 603 88 118 -0.9 
 
 
 
Y ≡•  rate of growth of the real GDP; CP• I⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ≡ percentage change in the CPI;  unemployment rate; U ≡ CA /Y ≡  current account balance as a 
percentage of the GDP;  relative unit labor cost in manufacturing: Finland/OECD; OECD = 100; CL ≡ XF /Mo ≡ Volume of Finnish exports to 
OECD in relation to total imports by OECD countries, index; W
• ≡ rate of change in the wage rate in manufacturing; r ≡  interbank overnight 
interest rate; S ≡ Index of industrial stock prices; PH ≡  index of housing prices;  terms of trade; TT ≡ BFI ≡ Blanchard Fiscal Impulse, % of 
GDP; Declining values indicate tightening (source: Honkapohja et al. (1996)). 
 
Sources: Bank of Finland, Statistics Finland, and IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1997. 
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Table 2. The Policy Effects in a Market-Determined System
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